

Dictated on telephone by secretary to  
Mr. William Borden -- Joint Con-  
gressional Committee on Atomic Energy,  
16 October 1951. -----

SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE

In the first month of its existence the Committee took  
two steps:

1. It pressed for a strong United States intelligence effort  
directed at the atomic energy activities of potential enemies; and

2. It brought unrelenting pressure in behalf of *all endeavours to*  
*secure info. which would enable the*  
*projectable to notify the United States when any atomic test explosion*  
took place on the continents of Eurasia.

The intensity of the country's interest as to both phases has continued  
at peak level throughout. The active intervention of a handful of  
individuals, most of whom are Committee members, may well have  
meant the difference between failure and success in becoming aware  
of the two Soviet bomb tests thus far announced by the President. Had  
these two tests passed unnoticed in the United States, the consequences  
~~themselves~~ to ourselves could have verged upon the disastrous.

This nation's overall atomic energy intelligence program  
encountered one notable defeat when, in its advance prediction as to  
the date of Russia's first test, it missed the mark by a wide margin.  
Although the important steps taken since that time to bolster the program  
are to be commended, it is felt that in this field almost no effort can  
be too great.